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8.1 Introduction
Many countries around the world have implemented subsidies for utility
consumption, especially in the case of water and electricity. Most subsi-
dies take the form of a lifeline or increasing block tariff, whereby house-
holds that consume less pay less on a unit basis. The idea is that house-
holds with low consumption levels are likely to be poor, and some
intervention is warranted to enable them to meet their basic needs (the life-
line) at an affordable cost. Whether such subsidies are successful at help-
ing the poor is not clear, as illustrated by the experience of a number of
Central American and Latin American countries.
Gómez-Lobo and Contreras (2000) suggested that in Chile and Colom-
bia, errors of exclusion (poor households not benefiting from the subsidy)
and inclusion (nonpoor households benefiting from the subsidy) for water
and electricity subsidies are large (for a review of this and other studies,
see Estache, Foster, and Wodon 2002). In Colombia, dwelling and neigh-
borhood characteristics are used as proxies for income in a six-tier classi-
fication of households. Households classified as belonging to the lower
strata get a percentage reduction in their water and energy bills that is
financed by a surcharge for households from the upper strata. Subsidiza-
tion takes place primarily within each utility, that is, the subsidies are
financed by higher tariffs on unsubsidized customers, but the government
also provides public funds to utilities in areas with few high-income house-
holds. Because eligibility rules are not stringent, the subsidy reaches a
large share of the poor, that is, the rate of errors of exclusion is low, but this
leads to large errors of inclusion: up to 80 percent of beneficiaries are non-
poor households, depending on the definition of who is poor.
In Chile eligible households receive a subsidy of 20 to 85 percent of the
water bill for the first 15 cubic meters of monthly consumption. The target-
ing mechanism is based both on regional data on water consumption and
tariffs and on household characteristics as measured by a national means-
testing system. While errors of inclusion for nonpoor households are lower
than in Colombia, the errors of exclusion are much higher at up to 80 per-
cent. In addition, research by Clert and Wodon (2001) suggests that the
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water subsidy’s overall performance in reducing poverty and inequality is
substantially weaker than that of other social programs targeted using the
national means-testing system. These other programs include noncontribu-
tory pensions for the elderly poor, family allowances for poor families with
children or pregnant women, subsidized child care centers, and housing
subsidies. Given that their impact on poverty and inequality tends to be
larger than that of utility subsidies, this raises the question of whether
keeping these subsidies is worthwhile, or whether the funds used for the
subsidies should be invested in these other programs. 
In Guatemala, following reform of the electricity sector, prices for resi-
dential customers increased after 1998, in some case by up to 85 percent
over a three-year period. To ensure affordability for poor customers, the
government introduced a social tariff for those consuming less than 500
kilowatt hours (kWh) per month. In January 2001 the government reduced
the lifeline to 300 kWh per household per month. This threshold, which is
similar to the threshold in Honduras examined in this chapter, is still high,
because an average household consumes only 102 kWh per month. An
evaluation by Foster and Araujo (forthcoming) suggests that two-thirds of
beneficiaries are not poor, and because the nonpoor consume more elec-
tricity, 90 percent of the funds go to the nonpoor. 
Finally, in El Salvador, until recently, the Electricity-Telephone Invest-
ment Fund subsidized residential electricity consumption for households
consuming less than 200 kWh per month. The subsidy was a flat 75 per-
cent reduction on the bill, paid by the fund to the electricity company every
six months. An additional subsidy came from the payment of the consump-
tion tax (13 percent) on that share of the household’s consumption. As in
other countries, this lifeline subsidy had high leakage rates to the nonpoor,
and it benefited mostly urban households. The subsidy was recently termi-
nated. 
In this chapter we assess the targeting performance of a similar subsidy
for electricity implemented in Honduras. Honduras is the second largest
country in Central America and one of the poorest in the Western Hemi-
sphere (World Bank 2001). The country has 6.5 million inhabitants. As
part of its efforts to reduce poverty, the government is funding two large
subsidies for basic infrastructure services. The first subsidy is for electric-
ity consumption, which in 1998 cost the government L 259 million (or
US$17.5 million at an exchange rate at that time of L 14.80 to the U.S.
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dollar). The second subsidy, with a cost of L 114 million in 1990, is for bus
transportation in the capital city of Tegucigalpa. These subsidies are large
in comparison with other social programs, because only one—the Hon-
duras Social Investment Fund—has a larger budget. Here we focus on the
electricity subsidy, which the state paid to the national electric utility on
behalf of beneficiaries. 
The subsidy is targeted through the lifeline principle; however, because
the consumption threshold for eligibility is relatively high (300 kWh per
month), and because those with access to electricity tend to be less poor
than those without access, the program’s overall performance is low in
terms of poverty reduction. Targeting through means-testing rather than a
lifeline, or at least a lower threshold for the lifeline, could help improve the
impact of the subsidy, and based on experience in other countries, would
not necessarily imply high administrative costs. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 8.2 describes the
subsidy scheme and assesses its performance. Section 8.3 illustrates how
simple techniques based on so-called receiver operating characteristics
(ROC) curves can be used to show how much improvement might come
from an alternative way of targeting the subsidy. Section 8.4 concludes.
8.2 Targeting Performance of Honduras’s 
Electricity Subsidy
Electricity access rates in Honduras can be estimated using the Permanent
Multiple Purpose Household Survey (Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de
Propósitos Múltiples or EPHPM). This is a nationally representative labor
force survey implemented with support from the U.S. Agency for Interna-
tional Development and conducted by the General Directorate for Statistics
and Censuses. The sample consists of 6,423 households stratified into four
geographic regions: Tegucigalpa, San Pedro Sula, other urban, and rural. 
As table 8.1 reveals, Empresa Nacional de Energía Eléctrica (ENEE),
the public provider of electricity, is by far the predominant provider of
electricity for households. A few households obtain their electricity from
collectives or privately owned electricity generators. Clearly access to elec-
tricity varies a good deal by income group and location. As expected,
higher-income households have higher access rates than lower-income
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households. For instance, 24.5 percent of all households in the 1st or poor-
est decile have access to electricity provided by ENEE compared with 93.3
percent of households in the 10th richest decile. Also as expected, house-
holds in urban areas have higher access rates than households in rural
areas. The fact that richer households have higher rates of access to elec-
tricity than poorer households is one of the reasons why from the point of
view of poverty reduction, and in comparison with other programs that
could be implemented to fight poverty, electricity subsidies may not be well
targeted. 
The design of the electricity subsidy in Honduras follows a basic self-
targeting structure, that is, households self-select themselves for inclusion
in the subsidy scheme by not consuming more than a certain amount. This
implies that neither the utility nor the government needs to design a more
complex targeting mechanism based on means-testing, whereby they use
household characteristics as proxies to identify who is poor and who is not,
and thereby who is eligible to receive the subsidy and who is not. As of July
2002 the subsidy was provided to all households that purchased electricity
from ENEE and consumed less than 300 kWh per month, the electricity
consumption lifeline. Specifically, households consuming less than 300
kWh paid the price of electricity at the 1994 rate plus an increase of 16.31
percent approved in 2000. Households that consumed more than 300 kWh
per month paid the full price at the 1997 rate plus the same 16.31 percent
increase. The government paid the difference between the 1994 and 1997
prices (L 23.8 million per month in mid-2002) directly to ENEE.1
To assess the targeting performance of the subsidy, that is, what share of
the subsidy goes to the poor, we combine administrative information with
household survey data. On the administrative data side we rely on infor-
mation provided by ENEE. This information includes (a) the percentage of
residential clients by consumption level, (b) the average amount of elec-
tricity consumed by clients at each level, (c) the total electricity bill with-
out subsidy by level, and (d) the total subsidy paid by level.
On the household data side, to estimate the proportion of poor households
at the various consumption levels we use data from a survey implemented
in 1999 by the Family Assistance Program (Programa de Asignación
Familiar or PRAF), with financing from the Inter-American Development
Bank and assistance from the International Food Policy Research Institute.
The survey was implemented in the bottom half of Honduras’s municipali-
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ties in terms of malnutrition as measured by the Ministry of Education’s
annual census of weight and height during the first year of primary school.
The survey has modules on expenditures, education, health, and the impact
of Hurricane Mitch. The advantage of this survey is that it includes data
on electricity consumption, which are not available in the labor force sur-
vey. The disadvantage is that the survey is not nationally representative,
but we assume that the results obtained here would also apply if the survey
were nationally representative.2
Table 8.2 provides the results. For example, according to ENEE’s admin-
istrative records, the share of households connected to its network with
monthly consumption below 20 kWh is 20.31 percent (115,723 house-
holds). Of these we estimate from the PRAF survey that 44.93 percent are
poor. That is, among all households that consume less than 20 kWh accord-
ing to the PRAF survey, about 45 percent have a level of per capita con-
sumption that is below a reasonable poverty line for Honduras. With aver-
age consumption of 3.36 kWh per household per month, the total
consumption for this group is 388,626 kWh. Without the subsidy this group
would have to pay a total bill of L 929,256, but this bill is reduced to
L 333,282 when the subsidy of L 595,973 is taken into account. 
Presenting statistics on errors of inclusion and exclusion is common
when assessing the targeting performance of a subsidy (see, for example,
Cornia and Stewart 1995). There are various ways to present these two
types of errors. The simplest way, used in table 8.2, consists of computing
the share of households in poverty and receiving the subsidy as well as the
share of households not in poverty that are also receiving the subsidy. In
general, as errors of inclusion increase, errors of exclusion decrease, and
vice versa. If all households receive the subsidy, there are no errors of
exclusion, but the errors of inclusion will likely be large because all non-
poor households benefit from the subsidy. 
In table 8.2, among those households that are connected to ENEE,
60.19 percent are nonpoor and receive the subsidy. By contrast, only 1.68
percent are poor and do not receive the subsidy (nationally, the share of
the population in poverty not receiving the subsidy is larger, because
many poor households are not connected to the grid). In addition, 23.28
percent of households that are poor receive the subsidy and 14.85 percent
of households that are nonpoor do not receive the subsidy. From these
results we can estimate that the ratio of poor versus nonpoor beneficiaries
(c) The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank
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is 0.39 (23.28/60.19), and so the number of nonpoor households receiving
the subsidy is more than twice as large as the number of poor households
receiving the subsidy.3
The most important statistic, however, is the share of the subsidy given
to the nonpoor. This tells us how much poverty reduction is obtained (in
terms of the poverty gap as defined in appendix 8.1) for each lempira spent
on the subsidy. As computed in the last column of table 8.2, this share is
above 80 percent. Part of the reason for the subsidy’s poor targeting per-
formance is related to the level of the lifeline threshold, which is set too
high. Some 83.5 percent of households with access to electricity consume
less than 300 kWh per month, and hence qualify for the subsidy. Further-
more, while the level of poverty is higher among households that consume
less than 100 kWh, most of the subsidy is spent on households that con-
sume between 100 and 300 kWh per month, but these households are less
likely to be poor.
In part because the subsidy is not well targeted, its impact on poverty is
small. This is illustrated in table 8.3 which provides poverty measures with
and without incorporating the value of the electricity subsidy in the overall
consumption aggregate. The table provides three measures of poverty: the
headcount index (the share of the population in poverty), the poverty gap
(the distance separating the poor from the poverty line), and the squared
poverty gap (appendix 8.1 provides a formal definition of these poverty
measures). The measures are provided for two alternative poverty lines cor-
responding roughly to the extreme poor (L 400 per person per month) and
the poor (L 600 per person per month). Overall the changes in poverty
when subsidies are taken into account are small, and these changes are
likely to be slightly overestimated, because we do not take substitution
effects due to the subsidy into account (if the subsidy were eliminated,
electricity prices would go up and households would substitute consump-
tion toward other goods). 
Although this is not reported here, we carried out additional simulations to
assess if the results are sensitive to the choice of the PRAF survey for the
analysis. That is, using a large set of variables common to both the PRAF
and the nationally representative EHPHM survey, and fitting a predictive
model of electricity consumption in the PRAF survey, we obtained a predic-
tion for electricity consumption in the EHPHM survey, and redid estimations
regarding targeting performance and the impact of the subsidy on poverty
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with these predictive values for electricity consumption in the EHPHM sur-
vey. The results obtained using this procedure were fairly similar. 
8.3 Alternative Targeting Indicators
The evidence suggests that Honduras’s lifeline subsidy is badly targeted
and therefore fails to benefit the poor very much. In this section we com-
pare the lifeline targeting technique to other means of targeting that
could use more and better information to determine eligibility for utility
subsidies. 
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TABLE 8.3. Impact of the Electricity Subsidy on Poverty, Honduras, 1999
Without subsidy With subsidy
kWh consumed/ Headcount Poverty Squared Headcount Poverty Squared
month (%) gap (%) pov. gap (%) gap (%) pov. gap
Poverty line of 
L 400/person/
month
0–20 44.93 12.42 5.99 44.93 12.29 5.92
20–100 36.00 10.45 4.26 35.66 10.19 4.11
100–150 20.57 6.06 2.61 16.82 5.60 2.35
150–200 10.98 2.67 0.93 10.98 2.24 0.72
200–250 15.64 5.32 2.00 15.64 4.56 1.51
250–300 17.09 3.06 1.02 17.09 2.38 0.79
More than 300 10.15 2.70 1.12 10.15 2.19 0.87
Poverty line of 
L 600/person/
month
0–20 71.01 29.00 14.56 71.01 28.85 14.44
20–100 63.47 23.70 11.60 63.47 23.36 11.36
100–150 44.74 13.97 6.75 43.39 13.29 6.34
150–200 31.26 8.19 3.35 27.45 7.47 2.95
200–250 35.80 13.15 6.05 34.16 11.88 5.21
250–300 29.15 10.41 4.37 29.15 9.36 3.73
More than 300 17.97 6.33 3.03 17.97 5.65 2.60
Source: Authors’ estimates using 1999 PRAF survey data.
(c) The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank
As mentioned in the previous section, investigators often analyze the tar-
geting performance of any given indicator, such as the lifeline level of elec-
tricity consumption used in Honduras, using simple summary statistics
such as the errors of inclusion and exclusion for a given targeting mecha-
nism. A generalization of this approach consists of using ROC curves to
assess which indicator—in our case lifeline versus various potential
means-testing mechanisms—has the best performance in identifying the
poor. More precisely, the idea is to use simple categorical regressions to
assess how various targeting indicators predict the probability of being
poor, and to see how the two types of errors (exclusion of some poor house-
holds and inclusion of some nonpoor households) vary with the choice of a
particular level of the indicator to determine eligibility. In some cases one
can find a best overall eligibility criterion independently of the weighting
of the two types of errors in policymakers’ objective function. In other cases
some weighting scheme is needed, and for any given weighting scheme, the
ROC curve can help select the best indicator. 
Our objective here is not to discuss the method in detail (see appendix
8.2 for an outline of the basic idea behind the ROC curve). Rather, we
focus on the empirical results for Honduras’s electricity subsidy. For each
indicator that can be used for targeting (lifeline or other), one associates a
curve that plots the probability that a poor household will be classified as
poor against the probability that a nonpoor household will be classified as
poor for every possible value given to the indicator. Note that the indicator
can be complex, that is, it can consist of a combination of indicators, as the
regression can be multivariate. If the ROC curve lies on the 45 degree line,
the model has no predictive power, because the probability that a poor
household would be classified as poor is no higher than the probability that
a nonpoor household would be classified as poor. The more the ROC curve
bows upward, the greater the model’s predictive power. A summary meas-
ure of predictive power is the area underneath the ROC curve. If the area
is above 50 percent, then the model has some predictive power. An area of
100 percent implies that the model predicts poverty perfectly. 
We used the methodology to assess how well various indicators per-
formed for identifying the poor among the sample of households with a
connection to the electricity grid in Honduras. We employed poverty
lines of L 400 (extreme poverty) and L 600 (poverty) to define the poor.
The first model in table 8.4 (household characteristics) combines infor-
LIFELINE OR MEANS-TESTING? ELECTRIC UTILITY SUBSIDIES IN HONDURAS
287
(c) The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank
mation on a number of household characteristics, including demograph-
ics, education, employment status, and geographic location. The model
is better at identifying the extreme poor (area under the ROC curve of
0.87) than the poor (area of 0.83). Within these household characteris-
tics (that is, with separate models with subsets of variables), demograph-
ics and education variables are better than employment and location
variables at identifying the poor. Housing characteristics can also be
used to identify the poor, with a similar level of performance (area under
the ROC curve of 0.82 for the extreme poor and 0.81 for the poor). Within
housing characteristics, the size and quality of the house are better at
identifying the poor than other characteristics. Finally, the lifeline
threshold (related to the level of energy consumption in the household)
has some predictive power (the area under the ROC curve is above 0.5),
but less so than some other easily identifiable variables. The bottom line
is that if the objective is to target the poor, variables are available that
are better at doing so than the level of energy consumption (see appendix
8.2 for examples of actual ROC curves). 
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TABLE 8.4. Areas under ROC Curves for Alternative Targeting Mechanisms, 
Honduras
Performance in identifying Performance in 
the extreme poor identifying the poor
(area under ROC curve, (area under ROC curve,
Model percent) percent)
Household characteristics 87 83
Demographics 72 71
Educational attainment 71 72
Employment status 69 66
Geographic location (department) 66 63
Housing characteristics 82 81
Size of house 77 77
Quality of house 72 72
Access to water and sanitation 61 58
Electricity consumption 70 73
Note: A larger area indicates better targeting performance.
Source: Authors’ estimation. 
(c) The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank
While it is not surprising that household or housing-based targeting indi-
cators would be better at identifying the poor than households’ level of
energy consumption, one might believe that for a service provider or utility
to gather such information could be difficult or expensive. Clearly means-
testing (using correlates of poverty for targeting) requires information, and
gathering this information requires effort. However, experiences in other
countries suggest that the cost of doing so need not be very high if the same
type of information is used for targeting a range of social programs rather
than utility subsidies only. 
More specifically, one clear possibility for reducing the administrative
cost of means-testing is to use a single system of means-testing at the
national level for many different programs. In Latin America this has been
done with some success in Colombia (the System for Selection of Benefi-
ciaries) and in Chile (the Committee for Social Municipal Assistance or
CAS), among others. In Chile, for example, as documented by Clert and
Wodon (2001), the CAS system is used as a targeting instrument not only
for water subsidies, but also for the family income subsidy, the social hous-
ing subsidy, and the pension subsidy scheme. Because the fixed adminis-
trative costs are spread across several programs, the CAS is cost-effective.
In 1996, for example, administrative costs represented a mere 1.2 percent
of the benefits distributed using the CAS score. If the administrative costs
of the CAS system had had to be borne by the water subsidy scheme alone,
they would have represented 17.8 percent of the value of the subsidies. The
cost of interviews for determining eligibility for the subsidies was US$8.65
per household, and the Ministry of Planning estimates that 30 percent of
Chilean households underwent interviews, which seems reasonable given
that the target group for the subsidy programs is the poorest 20 percent of
the population. 
8.4 Conclusion
Governments have a range of options for helping to reduce poverty. Simi-
larly, private utilities have a number of options for helping their low-income
customers. While decisions about the choice of a specific instrument are
based on various criteria, interventions whose benefits are immediate, visi-
ble, and administratively easy to implement and are supported not only by
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the poor, but also by the nonpoor or not as poor, are attractive from a politi-
cal economy point of view.4
Lifeline subsidies for basic infrastructure or utility services have all
these characteristics. The subsidies may take various forms, but their key
characteristic is that they are provided to all customers with a consump-
tion level below a minimum threshold considered necessary for meeting
basic needs, hence the use of the “lifeline” expression. Lifeline subsidies
have an immediate impact by reducing beneficiaries’ expenditures for a
given level of provision. The benefits of the subsidies are easily understood
(even though their costs may not be). Lifeline subsidies often enjoy wide-
spread political support, especially when the lifeline threshold is set suffi-
ciently high so as to benefit the less poor as well as the poor or the median
consumer as well as the low-income customer. The subsidies are easy to
implement at relatively low administrative cost because no means-testing
is involved.
For poverty reduction, however, while the characteristics of lifeline sub-
sidies help to muster support, they may not ensure effectiveness or a good
cost-benefit ratio. Indeed, one of the major drawbacks of lifeline subsidies
is that they may not be well targeted. When they are well designed, life-
lines can reach the poor through self-targeting. That is, if the lifeline
threshold is low enough, only those who consume little will be eligible, and
these customers may be comparatively poor. In many instances, however,
the leakage of lifeline subsidies to the nonpoor is such that it dilutes the
effectiveness of the policy for poverty reduction. 
In this chapter we provided a partial evaluation of the lifeline or increas-
ing block tariff electricity subsidy in Honduras. With funding from the gov-
ernment, the public utility is offering electricity at greatly subsidized rates
for those households with monthly consumption below 300 kWh. Because
the lifeline threshold is set so high, 83.5 percent of the utility’s residential
clients benefit from the subsidy. At the same time, 81.8 percent of the sub-
sidy may well be spent on nonpoor households. While this last statistic
could be lower if we were using a different method for measuring poverty,
it remains true that the impact on poverty of the subsidy is rather small in
comparison to its cost. The fact that the current subsidy is badly targeted
does not mean that it could not be improved by reducing the lifeline thresh-
old. A lower lifeline subsidy as currently being considered by the govern-
ment would have the potential of being more effective. Alternative proxy
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means-testing targeting mechanisms based on household or housing char-
acteristics could also be used to improve targeting. Nevertheless, experi-
ence in other countries such as Chile suggests that even with better means-
testing, other types of interventions would probably have a better impact
on poverty per dollar spent than utility subsidies.
Appendix 8.1: Definition of Poverty Measures 
This appendix, which is reproduced with minor changes from Coudouel,
Hentschel, and Wodon (2002), provides mathematical expressions for the
poverty measures used in table 8.3.
Poverty Headcount
This is the share of the population that is poor, that is, the proportion of the
population for whom consumption or income y is less than the poverty line
z. Suppose we have a population of size n in which q people are poor. Then
the headcount index is defined as
H = n
q
 .
Poverty Gap 
The poverty gap, which is often considered as representing the depth of
poverty, is the mean distance separating the population from the poverty
line, with the nonpoor being given a distance of zero. The poverty gap is a
measure of the poverty deficit of the entire population, where the notion of
poverty deficit captures the resources that would be needed to lift all the
poor out of poverty through perfectly targeted cash transfers. It is defined
as follows:
PG = 1n 
q
i=1
z –z yi,
where yi is the income of individual i, and the sum is taken only on those
individuals who are poor. The poverty gap can be written as being equal to
the product of the income gap ratio and the headcount index of poverty,
where the income gap ratio is itself defined as 
PG = I *H, with
I = 
z –
z
yq
 where yq = 
1
q 
q
i=1
yi is the average income of the poor.
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Squared Poverty Gap
This is often described as a measure of the severity of poverty. While the
poverty gap takes into account the distance separating the poor from the
poverty line, the squared poverty gap takes the square of that distance into
account. When using the squared poverty gap, the poverty gap is weighted
by itself, so as to give more weight to the very poor. Said differently, the
squared poverty gap takes into account the inequality among the poor. It is
obtained as follows:
P2 = 1n 
q
i=1
z –z yi
2
.
It is important to use the poverty gap or the squared poverty gap in addi-
tion to the headcount for evaluation purposes, since these measure differ-
ent aspects of income poverty. Indeed, basing evaluation on the headcount
ratio would consider as more effective those policies that lift the richest of
the poor (those close to the line) out of poverty. Using the poverty gap PG
and the squared poverty gap P2, on the other hand, puts the emphasis on
helping those who are further away from the line, the poorest of the poor. 
Appendix 8.2: Identifying the Targeting Performance
of Various Indicators Using ROC Curves
Following Wodon (1997), denote by P, P–, and P+ the number of the poor,
the number of the poor classified as nonpoor, and the number of the poor
classified as poor by a model. Also denote by NP, NP–, and NP+ the num-
ber of the nonpoor, the number of the nonpoor classified as nonpoor, and
the number of the nonpoor classified as poor. Sensitivity SE = P+/(P– + P+)
= P+/P is the fraction of poor households classified as poor. Specificity SP
= NP–/(NP– + NP+) = NP–/NP is the fraction of nonpoor households clas-
sified as nonpoor. The errors of inclusion and exclusion can be defined as
1 minus SP and 1 minus SE (other definitions could be used as well, but
ROC curves are based on these definitions). 
Nonpoor Poor
Predicted nonpoor SP = NP–/ (NP– + NP+) 1 – SE = P–/ (P– + P+)
Predicted poor 1 – SP = NP+/ (NP– + NP+) SE = P+/ (P– + P+)
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When using a statistical package and running a probit or logit regression
for poverty, each observation is given an index value equal to the predicted
right-hand-side of the regression. This predicted value is used to classify
the households as poor or nonpoor, with the computer typically using one-
half as the cutoff point, which we will denote by c (those above the cutoff
point are classified as poor). However, this cutoff point can be changed. A
ROC curve is a graph that plots SE as a function of 1 – SP for alternative
values of the cutoff point. Figure A2.1 shows the ROC curves estimated for
those with access to electricity in Honduras with two different models: the
housing model and the level of electricity consumption of the households
(which is a generalization of the lifeline used for targeting the subsidy by
ENEE). At the origin, c = 1, SE = 0, and SP = 1. At the upper right corner,
c = 0, SE = 1, and SP = 0. The higher the ROC curve, the better its pre-
dictive power (a 45 degree line has no predictive power while a vertical
line from the origin to the top of the box followed by a horizontal line until
the upper right corner has perfect predictive power). Clearly the housing
model performs better than the level of electricity consumption of house-
holds in identifying the poor.
The area below a ROC curve provides a summary statistic of the predic-
tive value of the underlying model. An area of 0.5 corresponds to the 45
degree line, which has no explanatory power. An area of 1 corresponds to
perfect prediction. If the ROC curve of one targeting indicator or set of
indicators lies above the ROC curves of all the alternatives at all points,
that indicator will typically be the best to target the poor for the class of
social welfare functions based on the two types of errors that can be com-
mitted through targeting. If two ROC curves intersect, the choice of the
best indicator will depend on the normative weights the policymaker
attaches to the two types of errors.
Notes
1. The tariff structure for 1997 distinguishes between households consuming
more or less than 500 kWh per month. For those households that consume less
than 500 kWh per month, the price is a flat rate of L 6.9 for the first 0 to 20 kWh.
Thereafter the unit price per kWh is L 0.6979 for 20 to 99 kWh, L 1.0173 from
100 to 299 kWh, and L 1.1829 from 300 to 499 kWh. For households consum-
ing more than 500 kWh per month, the flat rate for the first 20 kWh is 7.0800
Lempiras. Then the unit rate per kWh is  L 0.7161 for the next 80 kWh, L 1.0438
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for the next 200 kWh, L 1.2137 for the next 200 kWh, and L 1.3352 above
500 kWh. 
2. Using variables common to the PRAF survey and the nationally representa-
tive EHPHM labor force survey, we predicted energy consumption in the EHPHM
using a model fitted in the PRAF survey. The results obtained with the EHPHM
survey for the assessment of the targeting performance of the subsidy and its
impact on poverty were similar. 
3. Another way of defining the errors of inclusion and exclusion consists of con-
sidering the fraction of subsidy recipients that are nonpoor as errors of inclusion
and the fraction of households that are not recipients but are poor as errors of
exclusion. According to this alternative definition, the errors of inclusion are equal
to 0.72 [60.19/(60.19 + 23.28)], while the errors of exclusion are equal to 0.10
[1.68/(1.68 + 14.85)].
4. For issues relating to targeting, its costs, and the interplay with the political
economy, see, for instance, Besley and Kanbur (1993); Sen (1995).
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